Soldiers' Letters From The Front

                  

What we are really talking about are the wartime letters exchanged between both the front lines and the families at home. Letters go both directions in about the same number. Letters sent during wartime are among the most significant memorials a person can leave behind them. Some families have kept letters written by several generations of soldiers. Mine has letters written from before the Civil War through Vietnam.

If you read soldiers’ letters from different eras, they are remarkably similar. While some older letters talk about horses and more recent ones about helicopters, all of them communicate the writer’s feelings of fear, survival, boredom, and loneliness. Some offer eyewitness accounts of historic events. Others convey love and affection that under normal times may not be expressed as openly. Taken together, they represent a unique record of the sacrifices made by military personnel and their families at home.

They need to be preserved. Too many are discarded by people who either do not appreciate their significance or, sadly, do not want to recall those distressing times. Other letters, while being saved, are not preserved in a way that will make them available to future generations.

After the beginning of the 20^th Century, letters home rarely contained as much of a historical nature. Security and censorship was increasingly enforced during conflict. But some of the most interesting letters were written after a conflict ended. Soldiers were not sent on their way home as soon as the last bullet was fired, but were freer to write about things that they couldn’t communicate earlier. Foreign postcards, photographs of themselves and their buddies, and stories about battles and liberations were more common.

Following is a brief summary of how soldiers’ letters home have changed over our history. The final section will give you some guidelines for preserving your treasured letters.

Civil War

During the Civil War soldiers wrote an unprecedented number of letters home. Over the course of the war, some regiments were capable of producing 40,000 letters or more. This made the Civil War one of the most documented events in American history.

Between battles there were many hours of idleness. Sometimes they described the battles, but more often they wrote about their daily routine and desire to be home.

When you read their letters you will get a sense of what the soldier was like and what they thought about while so far from home. But writing letters home was only part of the process. Soldiers wanted letters from their family also. The arrival of mail in the camps was a cause for celebration. For many it was the only reminder of the normal life they had left behind.

It was very typical for a soldier to plead for their family to right back on a regular basis. There were few delights greater than receiving mail from home. One letter said, “Joseph, if you are able to write me a letter, I want you to do it. I have only gotten one letter since I left Camp Chase. I would like to hear from home every week. If you could see the men running when the mail comes in, you would write often. If I could hear from home more often, I would be satisfied.” (Harrison Clawson, 180^th Ohio Infantry, 1864)

Occasionally a soldier would get a package from home. It might contain clothing, candy, soap, or more writing paper. If their package contained cookies or a cake, that soldier would become the most popular man in camp. Home cooked food was more prized than any other item except a photograph.

To write home, a soldier would need paper, envelopes, ink and a pen. These could be purchased from “sutlers.” Sutlers were civilian merchants who sell non-military provisions to soldiers in the field or in camps. They sold supplies, including writing materials, from the back of a wagon or out of a tent. This allowed them to travel along with the army. Sutlers were common from the Revolutionary War through the Civil War.

In addition to holding a letter, envelopes could have a special purpose. Many were printed with patriotic or political statements. These were generally known as “covers.” Some private companies even printed envelopes for a specific regiment which listed all of the battles in which the regiment participated up to that point. In the later parts of the war, organizations gave out free paper and envelopes to the soldiers. The U.S. Christian Commission and the U.S. Sanitary Commission were known for this.

By 1864, the U.S. Mail Service allowed Union soldiers to send their letters home free of charge as long as they clearly wrote “Soldier’s Letter” on the envelope. Free letter delivery for soldiers since the Civil War has continued to be available. Confederate soldiers were not as fortunate. They often faced shortages of paper, envelopes, and pens. They were sometimes able to procure these things from Union Army prisoners, or off of battlefield casualties.

While all soldiers attempted to write letters home, not all of them could write very well and spelling skills were poor. The average soldier in the Union Army had a fourth grade education which did not allow them to master grammar, if they could write at all. Some poor writes would ask their buddies to write the letters for them. Today it can be difficult to transcribe some of the letters home. Spelling was frequently phonetic which made for interesting, and comical, interpretation. Letters from Confederate soldiers if read phonetically even reveals their southern drawl.

The practice of mail censorship began during the Civil War but was limited to mail that might cross enemy lines.

WWI

World War I was a massive conflict with millions of soldiers participating. The battles were enormous but during periods between them, the men in the trenches had time to reflect and write letters to their families. Many expressed their thoughts on being away. The folks at home wrote letters of support and updated the soldier on family events. And of course there were the “Dear John” rejections letters too.

Packages as well as letters were sent from home. By WWI the use of preservatives meant that some foods, such as baked goods, could be sent to a soldier with greater success. Pre-packaged foods were also available to send. A package from America might arrive in France in under a month.

With America’s entrance into World War, I things began to change. Military censorship of soldiers’ letters started in earnest. If specific information about troop locations fell into enemy hands, there would be serious consequences. Censors looked at two things; was there information that would benefit the enemy or would weaken morale (either the soldier’s or the people at home). Letters written in languages other than English were routinely intercepted.

There was no organized group responsible for censoring mail. Usually unit officers were assigned that duty. Some, opposing the practice, just ignored the task.

The British handled the issue of censorship more sternly. The British government passed the Defense of the Realm Act in 1914 which ordered that letters written by members of the armed forces to their families were to be read and censored by the authorities. Punishment for writing about the war could include imprisonment without trial. Still, British soldiers were encouraged to write home, but to conceal the horrors of war.

WWII

There were more Americans fighting overseas than ever before. It was a new world and soldiers had a front row seat.

Many families have saved the letters sent home during World War II. They were read around the dinner table, everyone sharing the news at the same time. The letters reflected a diversity of emotions from anger to humor to determination. And they were written by soldiers in places new to Americans - in a military hospital in a foreign country, the belly of a flying B-17, a bunk on a submarine, or in a prison camp.

SECURITY

Enemy intelligence was much more pervasive that in any previous war, and coded communication was an ever present concern. Written communications from soldiers were only allowed to be sent via the Army Postal Service. Any attempt to avoid this restriction by using civilian postal systems resulted in severe disciplinary action against the sender.

The U.S. War Department issued a list of ten subjects that were prohibited:

Don’t write about any military units including location, strength, material, or equipment.

Don’t write about military installations.

Don’t write about transportation facilities.

Don’t write about convoys, their routes, time in route, or incidents occurring en route.

Don’t disclose movements of ships, naval or merchant; or aircraft.

Don’t mention plans or orders for future operations (even if you are guessing).

Don’t write about the effect of enemy operations.

Don’t tell of any casualty

Don’t use any code, cipher, or shorthand to conceal the true meaning of your letter.

Don’t give your location in any way.

CENSORSHIP

Censorship became an even more important aspect of mail to and from the front. Soldiers were only allowed to write in generalities and could not include any reference to their location or even their unit. Their letters might say something like “You know what unit I’m in and you can follow our progress in the newspapers.”

Military senders would have their message read by a censor before it was processed. This was a common practice in most countries. Information of a sensitive nature related to troop locations and activities was obliterated, sometimes physically cut out of the sheet. Oddly, enlisted men, who knew little, were censored more severely than officers, who knew a lot. After a specific war-related event had been completed, and news of it already published in the newspapers, the censors would not delete it from the letters.

V-MAIL

My mother saved every letter that my father sent home from Europe during World War II. When I was old enough, I read them. Among the various written pages were some small, funny looking letters that looked more like those office message pads that people used before e-mail. They were from my father and sent to my mother, but I didn’t know why they were different.

It turns out that they were U.S. Victory Mail, or “V-mail,” for short. This was a novel method for servicemen abroad to communicate with their families (and vice versa) in a secure, quick, and inexpensive way. Here is how it worked. The user would write their message on a special V-mail letter-sheet in the limited space provided. Each sheet was only 7” x 9 1/8”. The sender would add the name and address of the recipient, fold the form, and affix postage. If the sender was a serviceperson, no postage was needed. Only one sheet per message was allowed. The V-mail letter-sheet was a combination letter and envelope.

The V-mail letter-sheets were sent to a processing location and microfilmed. Each message was reduced to the size of your thumb-nail. We think of microfilming as a fairly recent invention but it isn’t. It’s as old as photography itself. It was invented in 1839 by the British scientist John Benjamin Dancer, and the first microfilm strips were patented in Europe twenty years later. During the First World War, microfilm strips were carried by passenger pigeons.

The rolls of microfilmed messages were loaded onto aircraft, flown to a receiving station near where the addressee lived, or was stationed if the message was originated in the U.S. An exact copy of the message was reproduced and enlarged, printed on photographic paper, then delivered. This method of mail processing was first invented ten years before World War II as a commercial venture by Eastman Kodak, British Airways, and Pan-Am Airways working together. It was called “Airgraph.”

The first use of V-mail began in mid-1943. After two years, over 500 million pieces of mail were sent from the U.S. to service people overseas, and another 500 million messages were returned home by the soldiers and sailors. There were significant benefits for the military which flew all messages. It took 37 mail bags to hold 150,000 one-page regular letters but only one mail bag to carry the same number in microfilmed form. The weight reduction corresponded; from 2,575 lbs to just 45 pounds. The space and weight saved on each flight was now free to move war supplies.  

Even though posters were placed nearly everywhere urging the use of V-mail as a patriotic act, most people still sent regular first-class mail. Part of the drawback of V-mail was its small size (when the message was printed for delivery, it was only 4 ¼” x 5 3/16”); and part was that the photographic paper used to print the messages tended to fade over time.

In spite of this, V-mail met its anticipated advantages. It was more secure than first class letters because invisible inks and other covert methods could not be microfilmed. It was fast, it was inexpensive, and it freed up cargo aircraft space for other needed materials. All in all, it was a success.

Korea and the Vietnam Era

Letters home written during the Korean War and Vietnam War frequently contained more vivid descriptions of combat as censorship was less stringent during these times.

I remember that on my first full day in basic training our group was literally ordered to write a letter home letting our families know we had arrived safely at camp. We sealed the envelopes ourselves. There was no censorship, but then we knew nothing at all anyway.

Censorship became less of an issue during the Vietnam War. G.I. letters were reviewed and censored but to a lesser degree. Soldiers’ were generally free to write about their experiences and what they had seen in the field. Even hand drawn maps showing the soldier’s location were not generally deleted.

Mail service was greatly sped up by the late 1960’s. Letters from and to home could make the journey in several days.

Popular items sent to a soldier in Southeast Asia were magazines and pre-packaged snacks. Most of these were available near the combat zone through the U.S. military, however, so personal letters and photographs continued to be the most important thing to a soldier.

Today

When the Gulf War began in 1991, new types of communications with the folks at home also began. Hand writing of letters was largely replaced by electronic messaging, either by phone or e-mail. These have grown in popularity since. The internet is available to most soldiers serving in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

The two-way nature of electronic media gives the soldiers and their families the advantage of keeping in touch without waiting; and it boosts morale. Letters are still written of course but the normal delivery time is about two weeks. This is primarily due to the mobility of combat soldiers who routinely outrun the mail.

Service people in all branches of the military have been instructed not to send certain types of information over the internet. But experts are not too concerned about security as the military’s sensitive operations information is restricted to a network that is not connected to the publicly accessible internet.

Packages of course do follow the normal mail route. While most necessary personal items are available through the PX system, soldiers abroad still love to receive packages from home containing photographs homemade snacks, and special interest magazines. Since 9-11, all packages that go through the military mail are screened for chemical and biological weapons and explosives.

It may be sad for some to realize that the era of handwritten letters from the front is almost a thing of the past, but the nearly immediate nature of electronic messaging provides a greater option for staying close to your loved ones serving during wartime. 

Preserving Your Letters

Letters home from a soldier is part of your family’s heritage. They deserve to be preserved just like your Family Bible, marriage or death certificates, and old photographs.

In preserving your letters from the front for future generations, there are two overriding rules: (1) Find the letters, where ever they are. (2) Keep the originals safe.

1. FIND THE LETTERS.

If they were kept at all, they could be almost anywhere. Check your family bible, old trunks and luggage, desk drawers, closets, attics, and basements. Yes, even old shoeboxes. Ask others if they have seen the letters. Some people keep the old letters with the family genealogy materials.

2. KEEP THE ORIGINALS SAFE.

Avoid handling them.

Handling the original letters too much will always end with damage. The paper can be torn, pages can get lost, and the oils in your skin can harm the document.

Don’t use any method of attachment that could damage the letters. This includes stapling, paper clipping, or rubber banding. Discoloration or rust spots are likely consequences. Even post-it notes will leave an adhesive residue.

Don’t glue the letters into a scrap book or album. The best method of holding an old handwritten letter is in its original envelope.

Don’t write notes on the originals under any circumstances. If notes had been made earlier, don’t try to erase them now. It only causes more damage.

Always keep the letter with its corresponding envelope.

Envelopes are originals too. The writer may have neglected to put a date on the letter so the postmark on the envelope will help you identify the time it was written. Sometimes a return address on the envelope might help put the letter into context.

Don’t pass the originals around and never put them in the mail.

Remember, never circulate the originals. These valuable documents could get damaged or even lost forever.

If the letter was originally e-mailed, print it out; never leave it only in your computer.

This should be common sense. Computers can crash and your e-mails may be inaccessible. At the very least, they may be accidently deleted. Don’t take the chance. A clear, chemical-free plastic page holder would be suitable to hold the printed e-mail letters.

Store the originals safely.

After you have assembled the letters and put them in the sequence you desire, enclose them in a sturdy container that closes securely. Whatever container you use, make sure it is clearly labeled as important memorabilia - not to be discarded. Keep it in a cool, dry place. Prepare a list of the contents and keep that in a separate location.

Make sure that others in your family know that you have saved the letters, and tell them where you put them.

3. PREPARE THE INFORMATION IN THE LETTERS FOR OTHERS, INCLUDING YOUR FUTURE GENERATIONS.

This third step requires more time and effort but it is certainly worth it.

Copy the original letters for distribution to others in your extended family.

The best way to make the letters available to others is to scan and print, or photocopy, the originals. Keep the originals safe and under your control.

Transcribe the content of very old letters for the reading ease of others.

Transcription is especially useful for very old letters such as those from the Civil War. Many times, the originals are difficult to read. The paper may be crackled, the ink faded, or they could be written in pencil. We recommend that you first transcribe the letter exactly as it was written. Include all spelling and grammatical errors, you need to preserve it just as the writer created it.

Second, you might consider an additional version written with all original mistakes corrected. This will make the letter’s content much easier to understand by others in your family. But never make corrections on the original document.

Research the historical context in which the letter was written.        

This will be much easier if the letter or envelope has a date on it. From the Civil War onward, histories have been written about almost every military unit that has existed. They frequently exist for units down to the size of a single regiment. Many larger military units, such as divisions, have social/fraternal organizations that meet and publish their own histories. They can be easily found on the internet.   Army histories are usually published in books, but can be quite specific.

Some histories are so detailed that they delineate where the unit was, and what they were doing, on a daily basis during military campaigns. If you correlate the date on the letter or envelope to the unit history, you can determine where your soldier was and what circumstances he was under at the time he wrote the letter. The results of this can be very revealing.

Creating a short biographical sketch of the soldier writing the letter can also be valuable to others.

The Civil War History of the 57th Indiana (#8 of 52)

Rainy Nights in Tennessee. Beginning of the Corinth Campaign.

“The division, with other forces, all under Gen. Sherman, made reconnaissance toward Corinth, in search of the enemy. A few miles out our advance overtook the rear-guard of the enemy, and some skirmishing ensued, but the forces engaged were mostly cavalry. Our brigade was formed in a hollow square, so that we could be prepared for a dash (charge) in either direction. The ground on which we were maneuvering was densely covered with trees, and in some places it was difficult for us to distinguish between friend and foe at a distance of fifty yards.

“During our reconnaissance we passed a rebel hospital, which was filled with their wounded. Nearby were great heaps of cooking utensils, which they had abandoned, and guns of every pattern lay scattered around. A rebel rifle, much the same in style as our Springfield rifles, bearing on the lock-plate the inscription, “C.S., Richmond, Va.,” was found by the writer. This gun I regarded as something of a trophy, and carried it several miles with the one I already had. When in camp, I took great pains to keep it in good order.

“No fears were now entertained of an attack, and the men were ordered to break ranks and make themselves as comfortable as the circumstances would permit. In a short time it commenced raining, when we were called up and ordered to ‘invert arms’. It was now quite sixty hours since we had slept, and some, from sheer exhaustion, lay down to sleep in the cold rain. Resting our faces upon our hands, we huddled close together on the log, and by that means managed to nod and keep one side warm. When sufficiently roasted and steamed on the side next to the fire, some one of the party would give to signal to turn, and we would then rouse up, face about, and resume our position on the log.

“There were thousands of men in the field who were in a destitute condition. Many methods were resorted to, to improvise rude shelters to protect us from the rain and wind. The bark of trees, logs, poles, brush, old straw or hay, and indeed everything that could be of ant service was appropriated in some way. In passing up a road we accidently found a new Fremont tent, which had fallen off some wagon and rolled out into the brush at the roadside. We soon discovered that when unfolded it would be large enough to lie on and cover both of us, and without further ceremony we ‘turned in.’

“During the night of the 22^nd, one of the men belonging to our company died in his tent, and when morning came he was cold and lifeless. Even his bed-fellow did not know when he died. He was afflicted with heart disease, and had been unwell for several days. We were ordered to march immediately after breakfast, and a small party was left behind to pay the last debt of respect to a deceased comrade. A rude coffin was constructed of cracker boxes, and in that he was consigned to his lonely grave. His name was John H. Rinker.

“After the capture of Island No. 10, the forces commanded by Gen. Pope were conveyed on transports to Hamburg Landing, and were now moving toward Corinth. The entire army was now commanded by Gen. Halleck, and preparations were constantly going on for active operations against the enemy.”

(Middle Tennessee, April, 1862)

Excerpts taken from “Annals of the Fifty-Seventh Regiment, Indiana Volunteer Infantry: Marches, Battles, and Incidents of Army Life” written by Asbury L. Kerwood immediately after the war.

Pearl Harbor at 70: Controversy and Conspiracy?

For the last seventy years, a debate has raged among historians and authors about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Was the U.S. caught off guard? Or, was the attack expected? And even more inflammatory, was advance knowledge of the attack hidden from the military and the public by Franklin Roosevelt?

At least two dozen books have been written on the subject. Who knew what and when did they know it? Many people have claimed that a conspiracy was in place to hide the truth in order to support a larger objective; assuring U.S. entry into World War II.

Between 1941 and 1995, there have been ten U.S. Government inquiries into this controversy. Many of the important records were classified during the early investigations, but with the Freedom of Information Act passage, new evidence has now become known. Some of it seems to support the idea of a conspiracy and some does not.

The following is an attempt to review and summarize the major issues that may still be unresolved.

Controversies over the events before, during, and after December 7, 1941, can be separated into two distinct groups of issues.

FIRST. Did Franklin Roosevelt and his Administration attempt to pressure Japan into accepting concessions that would limit their economy and their ambitions of power? Yes, possibly. And, knowing that Japan could not accept this, would they take military action against the U.S. and Britain in Asia? Yes, possibly. And would that action bring the U.S. into the war against Germany, due to its military alliance with Japan? Yes, possibly.

SECOND. Were the controversial events surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor facilitated, or at least allowed, by the U.S. Government? Were lives, property, and materials sacrificed to provoke a war? That is left up to you to decide.

I. Provocations to Push Japan Into War

Accusations of conspiracy were directed toward the Roosevelt administration in that they allegedly provoked the Imperial Japanese Navy to attack Pearl Harbor and bring the U.S. into WWII, by popular public support.

But you first need to know the background of the situation.

Economic Strangulation

For three years before the Pearl Harbor attack, the Americans and the British secretly explored the possibility of war with Japan. In 1940, Japan agreed to withdraw from China; they also offered to pull out of the new Trilateral Treaty, their military alliance with Germany and Italy. Japan made these overtures in exchange for being allowed to expand their economic sphere without constrain by America, Britain, and other European colonial powers. These offers were turned down.

Later that year, Roosevelt began a form of economic pressure by embargoing strategic goods, especially iron and steel to Japan. The next year, oil shipments were restricted and Japanese funds in U.S. banks were frozen.

Caught in an economic vise, Japan began to hint at military action if no compromise was reached by the autumn of 1941. In November, Japan offered to negotiate peace with China and to withdraw its troops from Indochina if granted commercial stabilization. All the while they were moving military forces toward American, British, and Dutch colonies, in case their offer was rejected.

The United States and Britain found the Japanese offer “utterly unacceptable.”

But neither Winston Churchill nor Franklin Roosevelt wanted war with Japan at that time. Britain was locked in combat with Nazi Germany and couldn’t sustain a second major war on its own in another hemisphere. America was not in a position to enter into war at all. They needed more time to prepare.

Ten days prior to the Pearl Harbor attack (11-27-41), Gen. George C. Marshall had prepared a memorandum for FDR which read in part, “The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time . . . Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided.”

Was the McCollum Memo a blueprint for provoking the Japanese to attack.

A year before the Pearl Harbor attack, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) submitted a memo which conspiracy theorists point to as a plan of action to compel the Japanese to attack some U.S. installation. It was considered the famous “smoking gun.” In reality, according to the author Arthur McCollum, it was meant only as an outline of the East Asian situation and included recommendations to deter and contain Japan while the U.S. could better prepare for any future conflict, if it occurred. After the war, McCollum’s own testimony refuted any attempt on his part to advocate provoking Japan.

Additionally, McCollum was never in contact with FDR, and there is no indication that the President ever saw the memo.

Would Americans support a war with Japan?

People pointing to a conspiracy believe that without a Japanese attack, Americans would have never supported a war with Japan. This was very far from the truth however. Isolationism and anti-war sentiment was quickly fading during the summer of 1941. Over 67% of the American public felt that the U.S. should risk war with Japan rather than allow it to grow more dominant (70% felt the same way towards Nazi Germany).

In all likelihood Roosevelt would have had little difficulty getting a declaration of war against Japan after all the attempts at negotiation had failed in November of 1941.

To believe that FDR was willing to sacrifice the most important military base in the Pacific, most of the U.S. Pacific fleet, and thousands of American casualties in order to gain support for a declaration of war that already had a two-to-one public approval rating doesn’t make any sense at all. The votes in Congress were equally easy to obtain.

Did Roosevelt know that there would be an attack on American or British possessions in the Pacific? Yes, probably. Did he know where? No.

II. Was there advance knowledge of Japan’s attack and a conspiracy to keep this a secret?

The following events are all claimed to be indications of a conspiracy by the U.S. Government to allow a Japanese attack on America.

Japanese secret codes had already been deciphered; we knew what they planned to do.

It is true that American intelligence had broken some Japanese codes, and had perceived of a warning of an attack to take place, somewhere. They also had information the British cracked and passed on.

It’s important to realize that in Japan prior to the war, there was a rise to power of a group of generals and admirals who were challenging the civilian government. They were the new “Shoguns.” This new power structure in Japan did not always inform its diplomats of planned operations, even in secret coded messages.

While the “diplomatic” code (called “Purple”) had been decoded, the “military” codes, including the Imperial Japanese Navy code, called JN-25, had NOT been cracked. The new version of JN-25 in use by Japan prior to Pearl Harbor was not decrypted until May of 1942. So the coded messages that the U.S. could intercept were the less significant diplomatic ones, not the crucial military ones.

It was discovered that the Japanese were going to deliver a specific message to the State Department on December 7^th and then destroy their cipher machine and all secret documents. It was clear that something was about to happen but no one could be sure where to expect a Japanese attack. There were a lot of more likely targets than Pearl Harbor. The best estimate was the Philippines, Thailand, or Borneo; and warnings were sent on to the forces in those regions.

Knowledge of an, as yet, undelivered Japanese Declaration of War was ignored by the Secretary of State.

U.S. Intelligence cryptographers discovered that the Japanese Ambassador to Washington was supposed to deliver a document to the Secretary of State. This was shortly before the attack was commenced on Pearl Harbor. The State Department was convinced that it was a Declaration of War. If a conspiracy to start a war against Japan existed, the interception of this secret communication to the Japanese Ambassador was all the justification needed.

The document was not a Declaration of War or a breaking off of diplomatic relations. It was just a restating of Japanese grievances against the U.S. The actual Declaration of War was not announced until after the Pearl Harbor attack.  

The Japanese “Kido Butai” (mobile strike force) was detected and monitored approaching Pearl Harbor but no action was taken.

The “Kido Butai” sailed from the Kurile Islands on October 26^th with 55 ships, including six carriers and 27 submarines. Its air strength consisted of 402 combat aircraft (fighters, torpedo bombers, and dive bombers).

Claims have been made that radio signals were detected by U.S. intelligence that confirmed an attack on Pearl Harbor. This is actually the most easily dismissed of all conspiracy theories. The Imperial Japanese Navy felt that secrecy was so critical to the success of the mission that radio silence would be strictly enforced.

In fact, the fleet’s radio operators were left behind in Japan to send fake communications indicating that the fleet was still in home waters. Every day false dispatches were broadcast and U.S. intelligence concluded that the Japanese fleet was still training in the Sea of Japan. American radiomen later swore that they recognized the distinctive pattern of the Japanese radio operators, which of course they did.

All radio transmitters on all ships were disabled (even the ones mounted in the aircraft). The fuses in the radio circuits and the keys to all radios were removed and impounded. The only communication allowed between the ships was by flags or blinking lights, as all ships were ordered to stay in a line of sight.

After the war, Japanese Naval officers insisted that there was no radio traffic emanating from their fleet at any time between leaving Japan and arriving near Hawaii on December 7^th. Per the custodians of the Freedom of Information Act requests, “The source documentation shows that not one single radio direction finder bearing, much less a location fix, was obtained on any Kido Butai unit or command during its transit from Saeki Bay, Kyushu to Hawaii.”

Some believe that the Matson passenger liner “Lurline,” in route from San Francisco to Hawaii, heard radio traffic which continued for several days and plotted the movement of a large group of surface ships heading eastward across the Pacific. The records of the Lurline have disappeared, however, and there was no Navy or Coast Guard report made. Matson radiomen later reported that the signal they were following eventually “bunched up” and stopped moving. The likely origin of the radio traffic they heard was commercial fishing vessels.

American forces on Hawaii were not properly prepared for hostilities.

The Japanese consulate in Honolulu had a staff of undercover intelligence officers reporting to the Imperial Japanese Navy. They had reported on U.S. Navy operations for years. The master spy, Takeo Yoshikawa, found the Pearl Harbor security so lax that he even inspected the fleet close up on the Navy’s own harbor tour boat. But even that was unnecessary. Anyone sitting on the accessible hills above the Harbor could observe and photograph everything.

The senior U.S. commanders in Hawaii were Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, of the Navy, and General Walter C. Short, of the Army. All Navy facilities and ships at Pearl Harbor were considered under the protection of the U.S. Army.

Two weeks prior to the attack, both Navy and Army commanders were sent warnings of possible war with Japan and ordered to make defensive adjustments and be on alert. These warnings never specifically mentioned Pearl Harbor, focusing on installations farther to the west.

Gen. Short was concerned mostly with possible sabotage, as it frequently preceded attacks. He ordered the AAF aircraft to be parked in close formation near the center of the airfield. This was appropriate for sabotage, but turned out to be a disaster in an air strike.

The most important radar installations were not yet integrated into the local command after a year of work, and no urgency was exhibited even after the warnings. Leisurely training continued as before. Anti-aircraft guns were in a low state of readiness as well with ammunition locked up far away from guns. Neither Army nor Navy aircraft were actively used for patrols. Many were undergoing routine maintenance and partially disassembled.

Rivalries between the services, especially between Kimmel and Short, made the situation worse. Even though Short was responsible for the security of the island, most intelligence information was sent to Kimmel. The Admiral did not keep General Short in the loop most of the time. Military men of the caliber of Kimmel and Short should have recognized the importance of the alerts, even though the chance of attack at Pearl Harbor was slight, but they didn’t. Later, both officers were considered for Court Marshal, but it was dropped due to security concerns.

Another factor was that Navy commanders at Pearl Harbor believed that the harbor was immune to torpedo attack because it was too shallow. Even though Naval Operations insisted that no harbor should be considered safe from air launched torpedoes. Additionally, anti-torpedo netting was not used around the ships because removing it would be time-consuming and slow the ships from leaving the harbor on short notice.

The Japanese decision to focus their attack as far to the east as Pearl Harbor and to use aircraft to disable the American fleet was so radical that needed analysis and preparation was not even considered.

While these decisions were regrettable, the local commanders could not be accused of being part of a high level conspiracy since alerts from Washington did not specifically designate Pearl Harbor as a prime target for attack.

Note: Douglas MacArthur, who had complete access to intelligence and the motivation to act, seeing Japanese forces in his region, was also unprepared for attack. Most of his aircraft were sitting on the ground when the Japanese attacked the day after Pearl Harbor.

US aircraft carriers were put to sea before the attack to keep them safe. 

Some people believe that the aircraft carriers stationed at Pearl Harbor were put out to sea because of a suspected Japanese attack. They feel that Roosevelt and the Navy Department knew that any future sea combat would be dominated by aircraft carriers and they wanted to keep the few available safe from any premature engagement. Conspiracists use this as proof that the U.S. Government knew the country would be attacked by Japan.

This is incorrect on two counts. First, few people at the time thought that the aircraft carriers would become the valuable weapons that they proved to be later in 1942 at the Battle of Midway. Most Naval leaders, the Japanese included, believed that battleships would do the real fighting. Carriers were classified as fleet scouting elements and relatively expendable.

Second, the two carriers that were assigned to Pearl Harbor were the Enterprise (pictured) and the Lexington (the third carrier, Saratoga, was in dry dock in Oregon). Both active carriers were on secret missions, planned in August of 1941, to deliver fighters to Wake and Midway Islands in a build-up of forces at those locations. These orders were never changed. The fighters they were transporting could not have flown those distances so they were being taken by ship. Both carriers were widely separated from each other (not allowing one to support the other) and they were lightly escorted; and they probably could not have been defended in a massive assault. If these were thought to be such valuable assets, they would not have been on this mission.

In fact, the Enterprise had delivered its cargo and was headed back to Pearl Harbor. It was only 200 miles west of Hawaii and was due to arrive at Pearl on December 6^th (the day before the attack). A storm delayed her arrival but she was close enough to send her aircraft ahead to Pearl Harbor as the attack was still in progress. Some of the Enterprise’s aircraft were shot down by “friendly fire.”

American commanders at Pearl Harbor were not alerted to imminent attack until December 7^th.

A Japanese attack was expected almost anywhere, except at Pearl Harbor. Since the Japanese were engaged in an invasion of Thailand, it seems unlikely that they would mount a second major campaign in the autumn of 1941. Even less likely was an air attack. Kimmel and Short had good reason to feel safe.

War became a certainty only about 12 hours before the attack when Japanese diplomats in Washington met with the State Department to refuse the latest political and economic demands of the U.S.

Pearl Harbor Navy and Army commanders did not receive urgent messages about impending war until the morning of the attack. Conspiracy theorists believe that this was an intentional delay to prevent the forces at Pearl Harbor from bracing for the attack.

General George Marshall had a message sent to all Pacific forces alerting them to imminent hostilities with Japan but atmospheric conditions prevented communication between Washington and Pearl Harbor. His message was sent via Western Union but did not arrive until the morning of December 7^th and was further delayed by the air raid itself.

If a conspiracy was in the works, why send a warning at all?

Local reports of enemy activity just before the air attack were ignored.

Technicians at the Opana Point radar site reported that a sizeable formation of aircraft were spotted approaching the island about an hour before they actually reached Pearl Harbor. They called the Fighter Information Center, which was new and not completely functional yet, to alert them. The officer in charge thought the formation was a flight of B-17’s due that day from the U.S. mainland and told the operators to forget the radar signal. Since the report went no higher than the on duty Lieutenant, it was unlikely that there was any conspiracy involved.

Some people point to an incident of military action just outside the harbor entrance that was not reported quickly to top command as proof that a conspiracy to allow the attack was in place. The USS Ward was on anti-submarine patrol near the harbor entrance when it sent a message that a submarine had been engaged and sunk. This was more than an hour before Japanese bombers arrived. The Sub Captain’s actual report was that a sub was encountered but not sunk. He asked land based communication to advise him as to his next action. Decoding his message and encoding a reply took time, during which the air attack had begun.

In Conclusion

The attack upon Pearl Harbor cost America 3,649 human casualties. The U.S. Pacific fleet was significantly damaged, and took nearly two years to recover. All eight of the Navy’s battleships in port were either sunk or damaged. The Army lost 335 of its 390 aircraft.

Four days later on December 11^th, Hitler declared war on the U.S. in support of his ally Japan, and America had entered the war in Europe as well.

Americans were shocked and horrified by the carnage at Pearl Harbor. And there was no longer any reason to hold onto our isolationist position. We were at war. The next four years saw a desperate struggle with the Empire of Japan play out from one island to the next. When it was over, there was a new world order. A Nuclear World.