Pearl Harbor at 70: Controversy and Conspiracy?

For the last seventy years, a debate has raged among historians and authors about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Was the U.S. caught off guard? Or, was the attack expected? And even more inflammatory, was advance knowledge of the attack hidden from the military and the public by Franklin Roosevelt?

At least two dozen books have been written on the subject. Who knew what and when did they know it? Many people have claimed that a conspiracy was in place to hide the truth in order to support a larger objective; assuring U.S. entry into World War II.

Between 1941 and 1995, there have been ten U.S. Government inquiries into this controversy. Many of the important records were classified during the early investigations, but with the Freedom of Information Act passage, new evidence has now become known. Some of it seems to support the idea of a conspiracy and some does not.

The following is an attempt to review and summarize the major issues that may still be unresolved.

Controversies over the events before, during, and after December 7, 1941, can be separated into two distinct groups of issues.

FIRST. Did Franklin Roosevelt and his Administration attempt to pressure Japan into accepting concessions that would limit their economy and their ambitions of power? Yes, possibly. And, knowing that Japan could not accept this, would they take military action against the U.S. and Britain in Asia? Yes, possibly. And would that action bring the U.S. into the war against Germany, due to its military alliance with Japan? Yes, possibly.

SECOND. Were the controversial events surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor facilitated, or at least allowed, by the U.S. Government? Were lives, property, and materials sacrificed to provoke a war? That is left up to you to decide.

I. Provocations to Push Japan Into War

Accusations of conspiracy were directed toward the Roosevelt administration in that they allegedly provoked the Imperial Japanese Navy to attack Pearl Harbor and bring the U.S. into WWII, by popular public support.

But you first need to know the background of the situation.

Economic Strangulation

For three years before the Pearl Harbor attack, the Americans and the British secretly explored the possibility of war with Japan. In 1940, Japan agreed to withdraw from China; they also offered to pull out of the new Trilateral Treaty, their military alliance with Germany and Italy. Japan made these overtures in exchange for being allowed to expand their economic sphere without constrain by America, Britain, and other European colonial powers. These offers were turned down.

Later that year, Roosevelt began a form of economic pressure by embargoing strategic goods, especially iron and steel to Japan. The next year, oil shipments were restricted and Japanese funds in U.S. banks were frozen.

Caught in an economic vise, Japan began to hint at military action if no compromise was reached by the autumn of 1941. In November, Japan offered to negotiate peace with China and to withdraw its troops from Indochina if granted commercial stabilization. All the while they were moving military forces toward American, British, and Dutch colonies, in case their offer was rejected.

The United States and Britain found the Japanese offer “utterly unacceptable.”

But neither Winston Churchill nor Franklin Roosevelt wanted war with Japan at that time. Britain was locked in combat with Nazi Germany and couldn’t sustain a second major war on its own in another hemisphere. America was not in a position to enter into war at all. They needed more time to prepare.

Ten days prior to the Pearl Harbor attack (11-27-41), Gen. George C. Marshall had prepared a memorandum for FDR which read in part, “The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time . . . Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided.”

Was the McCollum Memo a blueprint for provoking the Japanese to attack.

A year before the Pearl Harbor attack, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) submitted a memo which conspiracy theorists point to as a plan of action to compel the Japanese to attack some U.S. installation. It was considered the famous “smoking gun.” In reality, according to the author Arthur McCollum, it was meant only as an outline of the East Asian situation and included recommendations to deter and contain Japan while the U.S. could better prepare for any future conflict, if it occurred. After the war, McCollum’s own testimony refuted any attempt on his part to advocate provoking Japan.

Additionally, McCollum was never in contact with FDR, and there is no indication that the President ever saw the memo.

Would Americans support a war with Japan?

People pointing to a conspiracy believe that without a Japanese attack, Americans would have never supported a war with Japan. This was very far from the truth however. Isolationism and anti-war sentiment was quickly fading during the summer of 1941. Over 67% of the American public felt that the U.S. should risk war with Japan rather than allow it to grow more dominant (70% felt the same way towards Nazi Germany).

In all likelihood Roosevelt would have had little difficulty getting a declaration of war against Japan after all the attempts at negotiation had failed in November of 1941.

To believe that FDR was willing to sacrifice the most important military base in the Pacific, most of the U.S. Pacific fleet, and thousands of American casualties in order to gain support for a declaration of war that already had a two-to-one public approval rating doesn’t make any sense at all. The votes in Congress were equally easy to obtain.

Did Roosevelt know that there would be an attack on American or British possessions in the Pacific? Yes, probably. Did he know where? No.

II. Was there advance knowledge of Japan’s attack and a conspiracy to keep this a secret?

The following events are all claimed to be indications of a conspiracy by the U.S. Government to allow a Japanese attack on America.

Japanese secret codes had already been deciphered; we knew what they planned to do.

It is true that American intelligence had broken some Japanese codes, and had perceived of a warning of an attack to take place, somewhere. They also had information the British cracked and passed on.

It’s important to realize that in Japan prior to the war, there was a rise to power of a group of generals and admirals who were challenging the civilian government. They were the new “Shoguns.” This new power structure in Japan did not always inform its diplomats of planned operations, even in secret coded messages.

While the “diplomatic” code (called “Purple”) had been decoded, the “military” codes, including the Imperial Japanese Navy code, called JN-25, had NOT been cracked. The new version of JN-25 in use by Japan prior to Pearl Harbor was not decrypted until May of 1942. So the coded messages that the U.S. could intercept were the less significant diplomatic ones, not the crucial military ones.

It was discovered that the Japanese were going to deliver a specific message to the State Department on December 7^th and then destroy their cipher machine and all secret documents. It was clear that something was about to happen but no one could be sure where to expect a Japanese attack. There were a lot of more likely targets than Pearl Harbor. The best estimate was the Philippines, Thailand, or Borneo; and warnings were sent on to the forces in those regions.

Knowledge of an, as yet, undelivered Japanese Declaration of War was ignored by the Secretary of State.

U.S. Intelligence cryptographers discovered that the Japanese Ambassador to Washington was supposed to deliver a document to the Secretary of State. This was shortly before the attack was commenced on Pearl Harbor. The State Department was convinced that it was a Declaration of War. If a conspiracy to start a war against Japan existed, the interception of this secret communication to the Japanese Ambassador was all the justification needed.

The document was not a Declaration of War or a breaking off of diplomatic relations. It was just a restating of Japanese grievances against the U.S. The actual Declaration of War was not announced until after the Pearl Harbor attack.  

The Japanese “Kido Butai” (mobile strike force) was detected and monitored approaching Pearl Harbor but no action was taken.

The “Kido Butai” sailed from the Kurile Islands on October 26^th with 55 ships, including six carriers and 27 submarines. Its air strength consisted of 402 combat aircraft (fighters, torpedo bombers, and dive bombers).

Claims have been made that radio signals were detected by U.S. intelligence that confirmed an attack on Pearl Harbor. This is actually the most easily dismissed of all conspiracy theories. The Imperial Japanese Navy felt that secrecy was so critical to the success of the mission that radio silence would be strictly enforced.

In fact, the fleet’s radio operators were left behind in Japan to send fake communications indicating that the fleet was still in home waters. Every day false dispatches were broadcast and U.S. intelligence concluded that the Japanese fleet was still training in the Sea of Japan. American radiomen later swore that they recognized the distinctive pattern of the Japanese radio operators, which of course they did.

All radio transmitters on all ships were disabled (even the ones mounted in the aircraft). The fuses in the radio circuits and the keys to all radios were removed and impounded. The only communication allowed between the ships was by flags or blinking lights, as all ships were ordered to stay in a line of sight.

After the war, Japanese Naval officers insisted that there was no radio traffic emanating from their fleet at any time between leaving Japan and arriving near Hawaii on December 7^th. Per the custodians of the Freedom of Information Act requests, “The source documentation shows that not one single radio direction finder bearing, much less a location fix, was obtained on any Kido Butai unit or command during its transit from Saeki Bay, Kyushu to Hawaii.”

Some believe that the Matson passenger liner “Lurline,” in route from San Francisco to Hawaii, heard radio traffic which continued for several days and plotted the movement of a large group of surface ships heading eastward across the Pacific. The records of the Lurline have disappeared, however, and there was no Navy or Coast Guard report made. Matson radiomen later reported that the signal they were following eventually “bunched up” and stopped moving. The likely origin of the radio traffic they heard was commercial fishing vessels.

American forces on Hawaii were not properly prepared for hostilities.

The Japanese consulate in Honolulu had a staff of undercover intelligence officers reporting to the Imperial Japanese Navy. They had reported on U.S. Navy operations for years. The master spy, Takeo Yoshikawa, found the Pearl Harbor security so lax that he even inspected the fleet close up on the Navy’s own harbor tour boat. But even that was unnecessary. Anyone sitting on the accessible hills above the Harbor could observe and photograph everything.

The senior U.S. commanders in Hawaii were Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, of the Navy, and General Walter C. Short, of the Army. All Navy facilities and ships at Pearl Harbor were considered under the protection of the U.S. Army.

Two weeks prior to the attack, both Navy and Army commanders were sent warnings of possible war with Japan and ordered to make defensive adjustments and be on alert. These warnings never specifically mentioned Pearl Harbor, focusing on installations farther to the west.

Gen. Short was concerned mostly with possible sabotage, as it frequently preceded attacks. He ordered the AAF aircraft to be parked in close formation near the center of the airfield. This was appropriate for sabotage, but turned out to be a disaster in an air strike.

The most important radar installations were not yet integrated into the local command after a year of work, and no urgency was exhibited even after the warnings. Leisurely training continued as before. Anti-aircraft guns were in a low state of readiness as well with ammunition locked up far away from guns. Neither Army nor Navy aircraft were actively used for patrols. Many were undergoing routine maintenance and partially disassembled.

Rivalries between the services, especially between Kimmel and Short, made the situation worse. Even though Short was responsible for the security of the island, most intelligence information was sent to Kimmel. The Admiral did not keep General Short in the loop most of the time. Military men of the caliber of Kimmel and Short should have recognized the importance of the alerts, even though the chance of attack at Pearl Harbor was slight, but they didn’t. Later, both officers were considered for Court Marshal, but it was dropped due to security concerns.

Another factor was that Navy commanders at Pearl Harbor believed that the harbor was immune to torpedo attack because it was too shallow. Even though Naval Operations insisted that no harbor should be considered safe from air launched torpedoes. Additionally, anti-torpedo netting was not used around the ships because removing it would be time-consuming and slow the ships from leaving the harbor on short notice.

The Japanese decision to focus their attack as far to the east as Pearl Harbor and to use aircraft to disable the American fleet was so radical that needed analysis and preparation was not even considered.

While these decisions were regrettable, the local commanders could not be accused of being part of a high level conspiracy since alerts from Washington did not specifically designate Pearl Harbor as a prime target for attack.

Note: Douglas MacArthur, who had complete access to intelligence and the motivation to act, seeing Japanese forces in his region, was also unprepared for attack. Most of his aircraft were sitting on the ground when the Japanese attacked the day after Pearl Harbor.

US aircraft carriers were put to sea before the attack to keep them safe. 

Some people believe that the aircraft carriers stationed at Pearl Harbor were put out to sea because of a suspected Japanese attack. They feel that Roosevelt and the Navy Department knew that any future sea combat would be dominated by aircraft carriers and they wanted to keep the few available safe from any premature engagement. Conspiracists use this as proof that the U.S. Government knew the country would be attacked by Japan.

This is incorrect on two counts. First, few people at the time thought that the aircraft carriers would become the valuable weapons that they proved to be later in 1942 at the Battle of Midway. Most Naval leaders, the Japanese included, believed that battleships would do the real fighting. Carriers were classified as fleet scouting elements and relatively expendable.

Second, the two carriers that were assigned to Pearl Harbor were the Enterprise (pictured) and the Lexington (the third carrier, Saratoga, was in dry dock in Oregon). Both active carriers were on secret missions, planned in August of 1941, to deliver fighters to Wake and Midway Islands in a build-up of forces at those locations. These orders were never changed. The fighters they were transporting could not have flown those distances so they were being taken by ship. Both carriers were widely separated from each other (not allowing one to support the other) and they were lightly escorted; and they probably could not have been defended in a massive assault. If these were thought to be such valuable assets, they would not have been on this mission.

In fact, the Enterprise had delivered its cargo and was headed back to Pearl Harbor. It was only 200 miles west of Hawaii and was due to arrive at Pearl on December 6^th (the day before the attack). A storm delayed her arrival but she was close enough to send her aircraft ahead to Pearl Harbor as the attack was still in progress. Some of the Enterprise’s aircraft were shot down by “friendly fire.”

American commanders at Pearl Harbor were not alerted to imminent attack until December 7^th.

A Japanese attack was expected almost anywhere, except at Pearl Harbor. Since the Japanese were engaged in an invasion of Thailand, it seems unlikely that they would mount a second major campaign in the autumn of 1941. Even less likely was an air attack. Kimmel and Short had good reason to feel safe.

War became a certainty only about 12 hours before the attack when Japanese diplomats in Washington met with the State Department to refuse the latest political and economic demands of the U.S.

Pearl Harbor Navy and Army commanders did not receive urgent messages about impending war until the morning of the attack. Conspiracy theorists believe that this was an intentional delay to prevent the forces at Pearl Harbor from bracing for the attack.

General George Marshall had a message sent to all Pacific forces alerting them to imminent hostilities with Japan but atmospheric conditions prevented communication between Washington and Pearl Harbor. His message was sent via Western Union but did not arrive until the morning of December 7^th and was further delayed by the air raid itself.

If a conspiracy was in the works, why send a warning at all?

Local reports of enemy activity just before the air attack were ignored.

Technicians at the Opana Point radar site reported that a sizeable formation of aircraft were spotted approaching the island about an hour before they actually reached Pearl Harbor. They called the Fighter Information Center, which was new and not completely functional yet, to alert them. The officer in charge thought the formation was a flight of B-17’s due that day from the U.S. mainland and told the operators to forget the radar signal. Since the report went no higher than the on duty Lieutenant, it was unlikely that there was any conspiracy involved.

Some people point to an incident of military action just outside the harbor entrance that was not reported quickly to top command as proof that a conspiracy to allow the attack was in place. The USS Ward was on anti-submarine patrol near the harbor entrance when it sent a message that a submarine had been engaged and sunk. This was more than an hour before Japanese bombers arrived. The Sub Captain’s actual report was that a sub was encountered but not sunk. He asked land based communication to advise him as to his next action. Decoding his message and encoding a reply took time, during which the air attack had begun.

In Conclusion

The attack upon Pearl Harbor cost America 3,649 human casualties. The U.S. Pacific fleet was significantly damaged, and took nearly two years to recover. All eight of the Navy’s battleships in port were either sunk or damaged. The Army lost 335 of its 390 aircraft.

Four days later on December 11^th, Hitler declared war on the U.S. in support of his ally Japan, and America had entered the war in Europe as well.

Americans were shocked and horrified by the carnage at Pearl Harbor. And there was no longer any reason to hold onto our isolationist position. We were at war. The next four years saw a desperate struggle with the Empire of Japan play out from one island to the next. When it was over, there was a new world order. A Nuclear World.

The Civil War History of the 57th Indiana (#7 of 52)

Shiloh: Advancing on the Rebels

“As soon as the regiments of our brigade could land and form their companies, we were off at the double-quick for the front. In less than half a mile from the river we commenced passing over the dead bodies of our men, who were killed on Sunday evening; and a little further on came the ground held by the enemy during the previous afternoon and night. Along the roads, and in the woods, we passed men coming to the rear, who were wounded in every conceivable manner. Some would tell us “Our men are cut to pieces!” others, “You’ll soon get to where there’s hot work!”

“A run brought us to the rear of our lines. By order of Gen. Hurlburt, the 57^th was detached from the brigade, and sent to assist his division. As soon as we could load our pieces the regiment moved out and formed on the left of an Illinois regiment. In our front lay an open field several hundred yards wide, and the enemy were in the timber on the other side. To our right and near was a battery, which kept up a constant fire, shelling the woods in front.

“When the line was formed, the command was given to advance across the open field on double-quick, raise the yell, and drive the enemy from the woods. Our colors were unfurled, and with a cheer the line advanced briskly across the open ground, until we reached the timber, when we gave them a sharp volley of musketry, to which they gave a feeble reply, and immediately started on the retreat. The fire of the enemy was both weak and scattering.

“We continued the pursuit some distance when, they opened on us with artillery; but on account of our being on lower ground, and a heavy timber between us, their shells were all too high, and caused no damage. Lying down on the ground we awaited their advance; but none was made, and in a few moments we withdrew a short distance, with the hope of drawing their battery into an ambuscade and capturing it.

“A line of skirmishers was now thrown forward, which followed some distance, when the pursuit was abandoned, and the men were ordered to rest on their arms. Remaining until dark on the line occupied at the close of the engagement, we were then moved some distance to the right and ordered to stand all night in line of battle, so that we might be prepared for any daring attempt which the enemy might make to regain his lost ground. No fires were allowed, and without either supper or sleep we took our places in the line, to pass another long and dreary night.

“Soon after dark the rain commenced falling and continued all night. In a very short time we were completely soaked. Our caps did not prevent the water from running down the backs of our necks, and we resigned ourselves to the thorough drenching we received during the weary hours of that memorable night on the field of Shiloh.

“After daylight we built small fires, and made coffee in tin-cups. I shall never, while I live, forget the appearance of my hands on that morning. I was so completely chilled and benumbed with the cold that it was in vain I attempted to straighten my cramped fingers; and my limbs resembled those of drowned persons after they had lain several days under water.”

(Shiloh, Tennessee, April 7, 1862)

Excerpts taken from “Annals of the Fifty-Seventh Regiment, Indiana Volunteer Infantry: Marches, Battles, and Incidents of Army Life” written by Asbury L. Kerwood immediately after the war.

Goodbye Ruby Tuesday: The Story of Foundlings

“During the depression, when families didn’t have enough money to support their children, they’d put them on a train and hoped that someone would pick them up who was able to support them.”

What Is A Foundling?

While some consider foundlings to be orphans, all orphans are not foundlings.

Orphans can be divided into two basic groups. The term “orphan” refers to children who have lost one or both parent by death. Children in the other smaller group, called “foundlings,” are orphaned by abandonment by their parent(s). This does not include children put up for adoption. Most foundlings never know their parents, even though some may be reunited later in life.

Foundlings are almost always abandoned by their mothers. They don’t intend that child should die, but are incapable of caring for the child either emotionally or financially; and for some reason they are reluctant to contact a social services organization for assistance.

A foundling generally has no name and no known parents. Most are discovered in a place where they are likely to be found such as a church or hospital doorstep. This is different from “feral children” who, while still abandoned, are missing either by accident, or are stolen, or left to die of exposure.

Ancient Practices

In ancient times the sanctity of young life was not always assured. In Greek and Roman culture, a newborn child was not considered as a fully viable human being.

Infants whose parents, or the state, were unwilling to raise them were routinely left exposed to the elements or subjected to starvation (as portrayed in the story of Romulus and Remus). Both of these methods were sanctioned by law and by public opinion. Roman administrators decreed that deformed children should be killed in the interest of healthy citizenship. In Greece, Aristotle advocated the enactment of laws which would prescribe the exposure of deformed infants or infants in excess of a socially useful number. Seneca and Pliny both supported allowing superfluous infants to perish. The number of these abandoned children that were reclaimed was very small and those were proclaimed by law to be the slaves of whoever rescued them.

The first serious attempts to rescue abandoned children were due to the early Christian community in Rome. Their influence urged Emperor Valentinian to decree that infanticide was a crime, itself punishable by death. Justinian abolished the practice of making rescued children into slaves; placing them under the care of the Christian Church.

Attitudes Change During the Medieval and Renaissance Periods

In medieval France, marble basins were placed near the church door so that parents could place their infant children so the church could assume care of them. The first “foundling asylums” were established in Milan in 787, Montpellier in 1070, and in Rome in 1198. They were associated with early hospitals which appeared during these same times.

During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the number of foundling asylums grew across Europe. This included Einbeck (1200), Florence (1316), Nuremberg (1331), Paris (1362), and Vienna (1380).

Most of these asylums had at least one design feature in common. It was a revolving crib built into the wall so that one half of it was always on the outside of the building. If an abandoned infant was placed in this crib, rotated to be inside, and a bell rung, the caregivers inside would go the crib to retrieve the child. The sad part of this is that the person abandoning the infant was completely hidden; and they apparently felt absolved from what they had done as evidenced by the huge increase of illegitimacy and abandoned infants. Therefore this practiced was almost everywhere.

Foundling asylums, however, did not become common in most areas of Europe. People still placed their small children at church doors. Those that did exist were greatly overcrowded, so the process of foundling adoption was intensified, as was done with other orphans.

Enlighenment During the 18^th and 19^th Centuries

“Josephinism”

Joseph II (1741-1790) of Austria became the Holy Roman Emperor at age 21 and immediately began changing things. Included in the 10,000 edicts he made during his reign was to make formal education available to all children, advocate religious tolerance, and encourage a spirit of service among his subjects. He is considered one of the greatest “Enlightenment” monarchs of Europe.

One of Joseph II’s statutes decreed that a mother who engages herself in a hospital for four months service would have her child taken in and cared for in an orphan asylum until the age of ten. The mother may reclaim the child at any time during this period without penalty. If the mother does not take the child back, it would be placed in a suitable home. The Vienna asylum is one of the largest in the world, caring for 30,000 children every year.

The London Foundling Hospital

In England, care of the foundlings was in the hands three types of organizations. Some were cared for by the Poor Law Guardians. Under their care, many were sent to workhouses (which gave them a roof over their heads and a little food, but that was about all) or were boarded out to families, who were usually compensated. Others continued to be sheltered by the Church, which attempted to also locate foundlings with private families. Failing in that, they went into the regular orphan asylums.

And still others were brought to the London Foundling Hospital which was established in 1739. This was the only institution of considerable size devoted exclusively to foundlings. It was founded by the philanthropist Thomas Coram. Its goal was to care for the “exposed and deserted young children” of London.

In 1756, Parliament decreed that all children offered up should be accepted, and that places across the country be designated where abandoned children could br brought, then moved to the London facility. Almost every child admitted to the Foundling Hospital was the first born to a mother who was unmarried.

A strong benefactor was George Frideric Handel, the famous composer, who conducted his “Messiah” there on frequent occasions, providing additional donations to the institution. The painter, William Hogarth, was another important contributor.

The hospital was relocated outside of London prior to WWII; the original structure was demolished. But the “Foundling Museum” in London has maintained the history and artifacts of the original.

Scotland never had a foundling asylum but did place foundlings in workhouses or boarded them out to families. In Ireland, the care of foundlings was accomplished through the Catholic Church.

New Names

In the 19^th Century UK, foundlings were sometimes given a surname that reflected the day they were found. They were frequently given a surname reflecting the day, or season, they were found.

“Foundling Tokens”

Many times, the children were found with some everyday object pinned to their clothes by their mother; usually a button, locket, or charm. These were called “foundling tokens.” Upon entry into the orphanage or hospital, these tokens would be attached to the child’s record of admission. Because foundling babies were given new names, these tokens helped to insure correct identification if the mother wanted to return and claim her child. The children were not allowed to keep their tokens. This may have been the inspiration for the name of the character “Benjamin Button,” in the 2008 film, who was a foundling himself.

In post-Revolution France, all foundlings were considered as wards of the state. Additionally, an early form of welfare was instituted by paying subsidies to the mothers of illegitimate children in order to keep the children in a home.

The U.K.’s “Infants Relief Act of 1874”, stated that every child under two years of age that is cared for by a non-family person (for hire) became under public guardianship. But the actual expense of caring for foundlings still remained the obligation of the church.

Italian and Russian Efforts

Today Italy, in proportion to its population, surpasses all other nations in the number of institutions devoted exclusively to the care of foundlings. In 1888, the Rovigo Provence established a system in which all mothers who acknowledge their infants are supported by the government for a year and a half. During that time, many mothers decided to retain custody of their child. This was a program which benefited the child and was less expensive to the community.

By 1898, the number of Italian foundling asylums was 113. They cared for over 100,000 children (the Florence asylum was the largest sheltering 6,500).

At the end of the Nineteenth Century, Russia had two very large foundling asylums that were established by Catherine II. The one in St. Petersburg cared for over 33,000 foundlings, the one in Moscow over 39,000. One policy was to encourage the mother, if known, to nurse her child, and to pay her for her service. This effort was to try to establish a bond between mother and child.

Foundlings in the Present Day

In Europe, foundling homes and work houses are largely a thing of the past. Berlin and Hamburg, Germany, have a program called “Babyklappen.” After leaving her baby, a mother has six weeks to return and claim the child. If she does, the situation is managed by adoption professionals and not the police. Charges are not filed. The program is being expanded to other German cities.

In large cities in the United States, there are foundling asylums operated by individuals, private charities, religious groups, or communities. In 1907, the Catholic infant asylum of Chicago had 676 children, Boston 858, Milwaukee 408, and San Francisco 480. There were 1,075 children’s homes of all types (including regular orphanages) that cared for over 90,000 young ones.

But in most cases in the U.S., placing children, orphan of foundling, into private homes under public supervision is still the preferred method of care.

Sadly, the number of foundlings doubled during the 1990’s in the UK. The reasons are still not understood.

Today’s Third World countries are a patchwork of ancient traditions, social upheaval, and economic chaos. Foundlings continue to exist and suffer as a result.

Child abandonment can be due to complex reasons. In some cultures acknowledging a child’s birth might actually put the mother’s life in danger; or the loss of virginity could make a young woman unmarriageable. There may be no one to help a new mother; social services and adoption agencies rarely exist. Even the child itself may be in danger. In some parts of the world twins are considered demonic. Overall there is a shared sense of desperation and shame which causes mothers to keep the birth a secret from her parents or doctor.

Continuing Issues

Psychological and Sociological research into parental motives for abandonment and the effects on the child have yielded some truths.

1. A reduction in infant mortality can be realized by programs to prevent illegitimacy.

2. In every case a reasonable amount of effort should be made to discover who the parents are and compel them to assist in caring for the child.

3. Charities are burdened by the volume of cases that should be borne by the parents.

4. Efforts toward giving the child the benefits of a mother’s care, and the parent an appreciation of their responsibility need to be properly funded.

5. The continued use of foundling asylums may be unwise due to marginal conditions and a higher death rate among their occupants.

6. The smaller expense of the family out placement system, and the fact that families are the natural home for infants, makes this process of greater value.

7. Finding suitable family homes in which to place abandoned children, or any children, is greatly influenced by the present economy.

Famous Foundlings and Abandoned Children

Moses

Nebuchadnezzer II, King of Babylon (605-562 BCE)

James Michener

Edward Albee

Henry Morton Stanley

Dave Thomas

Billie Holiday

Art Linkletter

Frances McDormand

Barbara Stanwyck

Fictional Foundlings:

Foundlings are frequently portrayed in literature as symbols of early struggles that are overcome including:

Oedipus

Romulus and Remus (founders of Rome)

Tarzan (by Edgar Rice Burroughs)

The Hunchback of Notre Dame (by Victor Hugo)

Tom Jones (in “The History of Tom Jones, a Foundling” by Henry Fielding)

Eppie (in “Silas Marner” by George Eliot)

Heathcliffe (in “Wuthering Heights” by Emily Bronte)

Benjamin Button (in “The Curious Case of Benjamin Button”)

Orphans usually come with at least some history, foundlings come with nothing.